for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney
Decision of August 23,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1109
NOTE: This case has been edited by
the omission of text, citations, and footnotes.
Circuit Judge Gregory
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals ("PETA") sued Michael Doughney
("Doughney") after he registered the domain name peta.org and created
a website called "People Eating Tasty Animals." PETA alleged claims of
service mark infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and Virginia common law,
unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and Virginia common law, and
service mark dilution and cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1123(c). Doughney
appeals the district court's decision granting PETA's motion for summary
judgment and PETA cross-appeals the district court's denial of its motion for
attorney's fees and costs. Finding no error, we affirm.
an animal rights organization with more than 600,000 members worldwide. PETA
"is dedicated to promoting and heightening public awareness of animal
protection issues and it opposes the exploitation of animals for food, clothing,
entertainment and vivisection." Appellee/Cross-Appellant PETA's Brief at 7.
is a former internet executive who has registered many domain names since 1995.
For example, Doughney registered domain names such as dubyadot.com, dubyadot.net,
deathbush.com, RandallTerry.org (Not Randall Terry for Congress), bwtel.com
(Baltimore-Washington Telephone Company), pmrc.org ("People's Manic
Repressive Church"), and ex-cult.org (Ex-Cult Archive). At the time the
district court issued its summary judgment ruling, Doughney owned 50-60 domain
registered the domain name peta.org in 1995 with Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI").
When registering the domain name, Doughney represented to NSI that the
registration did "not interfere with or infringe upon the rights of any
third party," and that a "nonprofit educational organization"
called "People Eating Tasty Animals" was registering the domain name.
Doughney made these representations to NSI despite knowing that no corporation,
partnership, organization or entity of any kind existed or traded under that
name. Moreover, Doughney was familiar with PETA and its beliefs and had been for
at least 15 years before registering the domain name.
registering the peta.org domain name, Doughney used it to create a website
purportedly on behalf of "People Eating Tasty Animals." Doughney
claims he created the website as a parody of PETA. A viewer accessing the
website would see the title "People Eating Tasty Animals" in large,
bold type. Under the title, the viewer would see a statement that the website
was a "resource for those who enjoy eating meat, wearing fur and leather,
hunting, and the fruits of scientific research." The website contained
links to various meat, fur, leather, hunting, animal research, and other
organizations, all of which held views generally antithetical to PETA's views.
Another statement on the website asked the viewer whether he/she was "Feeling
lost? Offended? Perhaps you should, like, exit immediately." The phrase
"exit immediately" contained a hyperlink to PETA's official website.
website appeared at "www.peta.org" for only six months in 1995-96. In
1996, PETA asked Doughney to voluntarily transfer the peta.org domain name to
PETA because PETA owned the "PETA" mark ("the Mark"), which
it registered in 1992. When Doughney refused to transfer the domain name to PETA,
PETA complained to NSI, whose rules then required it to place the domain name on
"hold" pending resolution of Doughney's dispute with PETA.n1
Consequently, Doughney moved the website to www.mtd.com/tasty and added a
disclaimer stating that "People Eating Tasty Animals is in no way connected
with, or endorsed by, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals."
response to Doughney's domain name dispute with PETA, The Chronicle of
Philanthropy quoted Doughney as stating that, "[i]f they [PETA] want one of
my domains, they should make me an offer." Non-Profit Groups Upset by
Unauthorized Use of Their Names on the Internet, THE CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 14, 1996. Doughney does not dispute making this statement.
Additionally, Doughney posted the following message on his website on May 12,
has no legal grounds whatsoever to make even the slightest demands of me
regarding this domain name regis tration. If they disagree, they can sue me.
And if they don't, well, perhaps they can behave like the polite ladies and
gentlemen that they evidently aren't and negotiate a settlement with me. . . .
Otherwise, "PeTa" can wait until the significance and value of a
domain name drops to nearly nothing, which is inevitable as each new web
search engine comes on-line, because that's how long it's going to take for
this dispute to play out.
PETA sued Doughney in 1999, asserting claims for service mark infringement,
unfair competition, dilution and cybersquatting. PETA did not seek damages, but
sought only to enjoin Doughney's use of the "PETA" Mark and an order
requiring Doughney to transfer the peta.org domain name to PETA.
responded to the suit by arguing that the website was a
constitutionally-protected parody of PETA. Nonetheless, the district court
granted PETA's motion for summary judgment on June 12, 2000. People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp.2d 915 (E.D.
Va. 2000). The district court rejected Doughney's parody defense, explaining
after arriving at the "PETA.ORG" web site could the web site browser
determine that this was not a web site owned, controlled or sponsored by PETA.
Therefore, the two images: (1) the famous PETA name and (2) the "People
Eating Tasty Animals" website was not a parody because [they were not]
Id. at 921.
subsequently moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court denied the
motion, finding that the case was not "exceptional" under 15 U.S.C. §
1117. . . .
. . . .
review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment
is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Trademark Infringement/Unfair Competition
plaintiff alleging causes of action for trademark infringement and unfair
competition must prove (1) that it possesses a mark; (2) that the defendant used
the mark; (3) that the defendant's use of the mark occurred "in commerce";
(4) that the defendant used the mark "in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising" of goods or services; and (5) that
the defendant used the mark in a manner likely to confuse consumers. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1114, 1125(a).
is no dispute here that PETA owns the "PETA" Mark, that Doughney used
it, and that Doughney used the Mark "in commerce." Doughney disputes
the district court's findings that he used the Mark in connection with goods or
services and that he used it in a manner engendering a likelihood of confusion.
1. To use PETA's Mark "in connection with" goods or
services, Doughney need not have actually sold or advertised goods or services
on the www.peta.org website. Rather, Doughney need only have prevented users
from obtaining or using PETA's goods or services, or need only have connected
the website to other's goods or services.
sparse, existing caselaw on infringement and unfair competition in the Internet
context clearly weighs in favor of this conclusion. For example, in OBH,
Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., the plaintiffs owned the "The
Buffalo News" registered trademark used by the newspaper of the same name.
86 F. Supp.2d 176 (W.D. N.Y. 2000). The defendants registered the domain name
thebuffalonews.com and created a website parodying The Buffalo News and
providing a public forum for criticism of the newspaper. Id. at 182.
The site contained hyperlinks to other local news sources and a site owned by
the defendants that advertised Buffalo-area apartments for rent. Id. at
court held that the defendants used the mark "in connection with"
goods or services because the defendants' website was "likely to prevent or
hinder Internet users from accessing plaintiffs' services on plaintiffs' own web
users of plaintiffs' services who mistakenly access defendants' web site may
fail to continue to search for plaintiffs' web site due to confusion or
frustration. Such users, who are presumably looking for the news services
provided by the plaintiffs on their web site, may instead opt to select one of
the several other news-related hyperlinks contained in defendants' web site.
These news-related hyperlinks will directly link the user to other
news-related web sites that are in direct competition with plaintiffs in pro
viding news-related services over the Internet. Thus, defendants' action in
appropriating plaintiff's mark has a connection to plaintiffs' distribution of
Id. Moreover, the court explained that defendants' use of the
plaintiffs' mark was in connection with goods or services because it contained a
link to the defendants' apartment-guide website. Id.
in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, the
plaintiff owned the "Planned Parenthood" mark, but the defendant
registered the domain name plannedparenthood.com. 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). Using the domain name, the defendant created a website containing
information antithetical to the plaintiff's views. Id. at 1435. The
court ruled that the defendant used the plaintiff's mark "in connection
with" the distribution of services
it is likely to prevent some Internet users from reaching plaintiff's own
Internet web site. Prospective users of plaintiff's services who mistakenly
access defendant's web site may fail to continue to search for plaintiff's own
home page, due to anger, frustration, or the belief that plain tiff's home
page does not exist.
same reasoning applies here. As the district court explained, Doughney's use of
PETA's Mark in the domain name of his website
likely to prevent Internet users from reaching [PETA's] own Internet web site.
The prospective users of [PETA's] services who mistakenly access Defendant's
web site may fail to continue to search for [PETA's] own home page, due to
anger, frustration, or the belief that [PETA's] home page does not exist.
Doughney, 113 F. Supp.2d at 919 (quoting Bucci, 42 U.S. P.Q.2d
at 1435). Moreover, Doughney's web site provides links to more than 30
commercial operations offering goods and services. By providing links to these
commercial operations, Doughney's use of PETA's Mark is "in connection with"
the sale of goods or services.
2. The unauthorized use of a trademark infringes the
trademark holder's rights if it is likely to confuse an "ordinary consumer"
as to the source or sponsorship of the goods. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
L&L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing 2 J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:28 (2d ed. 1984)). To
determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists, a court should not consider
"how closely a fragment of a given use duplicates the trademark," but
must instead consider "whether the use in its entirety creates a likelihood
of confusion." Id. at 319.
does not dispute that the peta.org domain name engenders a likelihood of
confusion between his web site and PETA. Doughney claims, though, that the
inquiry should not end with his domain name. Rather, he urges the Court to
consider his website in conjunction with the domain name because, together, they
purportedly parody PETA and, thus, do not cause a likelihood of confusion.
"parody" is defined as a "simple form of entertainment conveyed
by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized
image created by the mark's owner." L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987). A parody must "convey
two simultaneous -- and contradictory -- messages: that it is the original, but
also that it is not the original and is instead a parody." Cliffs
Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494
(2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). To the extent that an alleged parody
conveys only the first message, "it is not only a poor parody but also
vulnerable under trademark law, since the customer will be confused." Id.
While a parody necessarily must engender some initial confusion, an effective
parody will diminish the risk of consumer confusion "by conveying [only]
just enough of the original design to allow the consumer to appreciate the point
of parody." Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wylde, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987).
at Doughney's domain name alone, there is no suggestion of a parody. The domain
name peta.org simply copies PETA's Mark, conveying the message that it is
related to PETA. The domain name does not convey the second, contradictory
message needed to establish a parody -- a message that the domain name is not
related to PETA, but that it is a parody of PETA.
claims that this second message can be found in the content of his website.
Indeed, the website's content makes it clear that it is not related to PETA.
However, this second message is not conveyed simultaneously with the first
message, as required to be considered a parody. The domain name conveys the
first message; the second message is conveyed only when the viewer reads the
content of the website. As the district court explained,"an internet user
would not realize that they were not on an official PETA web site until after
they had used PETA's Mark to access the web page'www.peta.org.'" Doughney,
113 F. Supp.2d at 921. Thus, the messages are not conveyed simultaneously and do
not constitute a parody. The district court properly rejected Doughney's parody
defense and found that Doughney's use of the peta.org domain name engenders a
likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, Doughney failed to raise a genuine issue
of material fact regarding PETA's infringement and unfair competition claims.
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
district court found Doughney liable under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). To establish an
ACPA violation, PETA was required to (1) prove that Doughney had a bad faith
intent to profit from using the peta.org domain name, and (2) that the peta.org
domain name is identical or confusingly similar to, or dilutive of, the
distinctive and famous PETA Mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
makes several arguments relating to the district court's ACPA holding: (1) that
PETA did not plead an ACPA claim, but raised it for the first time in its motion
for summary judgment; (2) that the ACPA, which became effective in 1999, cannot
be applied retroactively to events that occurred in 1995 and 1996; (3) that
Doughney did not seek to financially profit from his use of PETA's Mark; and (4)
that Doughney acted in good faith.
Doughney's arguments are availing. . . .
. . . .
. . . [W]e
reject Doughney's first contention.
second argument -- that the ACPA may not be applied retroactively -- also is
unavailing. The ACPA expressly states that it "shall apply to all domain
names registered before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act[.]"
Pub. L. No. 106-113, S 3010, 113 Stat. 1536. See also Sporty's Farm L.L.C.
v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 496 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). . . .
third argument -- that he did not seek to financially profit from registering a
domain name using PETA's Mark -- also offers him no relief. It is undisputed
that Doughney made statements to the press and on his website recommending that
PETA attempt to "settle" with him and "make him an offer."
The undisputed evidence belies Doughney's argument.
fourth argument -- that he did not act in bad faith -- also is unavailing. Under
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i), a court may consider several factors to determine
whether a defendant acted in bad faith, including
the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if any, in
the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of the
person or a name that is otherwise com monly used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with
the bona fide offering of any goods or ser vices;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site
accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion
as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain name
to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without having used,
or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of any
goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact
information when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the
person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names which
the person knows are identical or con fusingly similar to marks of others that
are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive
of famous marks of others that are famous at the time of registration of such
domain names, without regard to the goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of
subsection (c)(1) of this section.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). In addition to listing these nine factors, the
ACPA contains a safe harbor provision stating that bad faith intent "shall
not be found in any case in which the court determines that the person believed
and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain name was fair
use or otherwise lawful." 15 U.S.C. § 1225(d)(1)(B)(ii).
district court reviewed the factors listed in the statute and properly concluded
that Doughney (I) had no intellectual property right in peta.org; (II) peta.org
is not Doughney's name or a name otherwise used to identify Doughney; (III)
Doughney had no prior use of peta.org in connection with the bona fide offering
of any goods or services; (IV) Doughney used the PETA Mark in a commercial
manner; (V) Doughney "clearly intended to confuse, mislead and divert
internet users into accessing his web site which contained information
antithetical and therefore harmful to the goodwill represented by the PETA
Mark"; (VI) Doughney made statements on his web site and in the press
recommending that PETA attempt to "settle" with him and "make him
an offer"; (VII) Doughney made false statements when registering the domain
name; and (VIII) Doughney registered other domain names that are identical or
similar to the marks or names of other famous people and organizations. People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 113 F. Supp.2d at 920.
claims that the district court's later ruling denying PETA's motion for attorney
fees triggers application of the ACPA's safe harbor provision. In that ruling,
the district court stated that
registered the domain name because he thought that he had a legitimate First
Amendment right to express himself this way. The Court must consider
Doughney's state of mind at the time he took the actions in question. Doughney
thought he was within his First Amendment rights to create a parody of the
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, Civil
Action No. 99-1336-A, Order at 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2000). With its attorney's
fee ruling, the district court did not find that Doughney "had reasonable
grounds to believe" that his use of PETA's Mark was lawful. It held only
that Doughney thought it to be lawful.
a defendant "who acts even partially in bad faith in registering a domain
name is not, as a matter of law, entitled to benefit from [the ACPA's] safe
harbor provision." Virtual Networks, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001). Doughney knowingly provided false
information to NSI upon registering the domain name, knew he was registering a
domain name identical to PETA's Mark, and clearly intended to confuse Internet
users into accessing his website, instead of PETA's official website.
Considering the evidence of Doughney's bad faith, the safe harbor provision can
provide him no relief.
. . . .
sought attorney fees of more than $276,000. The district court denied the motion,
holding that Doughney did not act maliciously, fraudulently, willfully or
deliberately because "he thought that he had a legitimate First Amendment
right to express himself this way" and "to create a parody of the
plaintiff's organization." PETA claims the district court's decision is
inconsistent with its bad faith finding under the ACPA, and argues that
Doughney's conduct established bad faith.
a bad faith finding under the ACPA does not compel a finding of malicious,
fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior under S 1117. The district court was
within its discretion to find that, even though Doughney violated the ACPA (and,
thus, acted in bad faith), he did not act with the level of malicious,
fraudulent, willful or deliberate behavior necessary for an award of attorney
. . . .
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.n2
Doughney registered peta.org, he agreed to abide by NSI's Dispute Resolution
Policy, which specified that a domain name using a third party's registered
trademark was subject to placement on "hold" status.
a finding of trademark infringement, unfair competition, and an ACPA violation
supports the remedy PETA sought, we need not address PETA's dilution claim.
to the overview